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COLLATERALIZED MORTGAGE OBLIGATIONS:
PROBING THE LIMITS OF NATIONAL
BANK POWERS UNDER THE
GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
In response to the stock market crash of 1929, Congress enacted the
Banking Act of 1933.' This legislation was intended to restore public confi-
dence in banking,2 to ensure and maintain the economic stability of banks by
prohibiting unsound and imprudent bank investments, 3 and to prevent po-
tential conflicts of interest between commercial and investment banks.4
Congress perceived the mingling of commercial banking and investment
banking as a major cause of the crash.' The obvious fear underlying Con-
gress' action was that banks would be tempted to invest their own assets in
frozen or imprudent stocks.6
Congress also perceived subtle hazards that could result from bank partic-
ipation in securities underwriting and marketing activities.7 The Supreme
Court has identified some of the hazards that Congress sought to avoid: that
the bank's interest in selling stock might impair its judgment on making
loans,' or that the dual role of commercial and investment banking would
1. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). The American banking system is a dual bank-
ing system in that banks may choose to be chartered by a state or the federal government.
Banks seeking a federal charter (national banks) must apply to the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC). National banks are required to be insured by the Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation (FDIC) and to become members of the Federal Reserve System. State banks
are chartered by the state in which they are located. Depending on state law, a state bank may
elect or be required to be FDIC insured. State chartered banks may or may not be members of
the Federal Reserve System as a state member bank. Banks may be regulated to varying de-
grees by a combination of the Federal Reserve Board (FRB), OCC, FDIC, and state agencies.
This Comment is primarily concerned with the OCC because it is the primary regulator of
national banks. The FRB also regulates all banks that are members of the Federal Reserve
System. This Comment will not address the status of collateralized mortgage obligations
(CMOs) under state regulations.
2. See 75 CoNG. REc. 3962, 3963 (1932).
3. See generally Note, Commercial Bank Private Placement Activity: Cracking Glass-
Steagall, 27 CATH. U.L. REV. 743 (1978).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 630 (1971). "Congress had in mind
... the obvious danger that a bank might invest its own assets in frozen or otherwise impru-
dent stock or security investments." Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 631. "[T]he pressure to sell a particular investment and to make the affiliate
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set the promotional interest of the investment banker against the obligation
of the commercial bank to provide impartial investment advice.9 Congress
responded to these fears by enacting the Banking Act of 1933 or the Glass-
Steagall Act (the Act),' ° which generally prohibits commercial banks from
issuing, underwriting, or dealing in securities except as set forth in the Act."
Although the Glass-Steagall Act generally prohibits commercial banks
from underwriting or dealing in securities,' 2 there are certain specific excep-
tions to the Act's broad limitations.' 3 For example, section 16 of the Act
explicitly authorizes a national bank to underwrite, deal in, and purchase for
its own account obligations of the Government National Mortgage Associa-
tion (GNMA),"4 the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA), 5
successful might create a risk that the bank would make its credit facilities more freely avail-
able to those companies in whose stock or securities the affiliate has invested . Id.
9. Id. at 630-31.
10. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78,
377, 378 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)). For an account of the Act's history, see Glass-Steagall
Act-A History of Its Legislative Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38
(1975); see also Symons, The "Business of Banking" in Historical Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 676 (1983); Note, supra note 3, at 747-50; Comment, Glass-Steagall.- Lest We Forget,
11 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 163 (1983).
11. See generally Operation of the National and Federal Reserve Bank Systems: Hearings
on S. Res. 71 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong.,
3d Sess. 1 (1931).
12. See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text. The Glass-Steagall Act is comprised of
four sections of the Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 21, 32, 33, 48 Stat. 162,
184-95 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
The Act generally prohibits banks from underwriting securities for their own account (with
exceptions for government securities), or from purchasing securities (with exceptions for cer-
tain investment securities). 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The Act also bans affilia-
tions and interlocks between banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System and
companies primarily or principally engaged in securities activities. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); 15
U.S.C. § 19 (1982). For a more detailed discussion of the Act, see infra notes 26-30, 32-59,
and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
14. 12 U.S.C. § 24. GNMA is a corporate instrumentality of the United States govern-
ment, authorized pursuant to title III of the National Housing Act, Pub. L. No. 73-479, 48
Stat. 1246, 1252-55 (1934) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). GNMA
guarantees, with the full faith and credit of the United States government, the timely payment
of principal and interest on certificates backed by pools of mortgage loans insured by the Fed-
eral Housing Administration, or guaranteed by the Veterans Administration. K. LORE,
MORTGAGE BACKED SECURITIES: DEVELOPMENTS AND TRENDS IN THE SECONDARY
MORTGAGE MARKET 2-2 to 2-6 (1986).
15. 12 U.S.C. § 24. As a corporation organized under the Housing Act of 1954, Pub. L.
No. 83-560, 68 Stat. 590 (1954) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.),
FNMA is federally chartered and privately owned. FNMA guarantees registered holders of
FNMA certificates an amount of money that represents a proportionate interest in both sched-
uled principal and interest payments, and prepaid principal payments on mortgage loans in the
pool of mortgages represented by the FNMA certificates. FNMA also guarantees the certifi-
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and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC). 16 These
agencies are primarily involved in issuing, underwriting, and dealing in
mortgage-backed securities (MBSs).I 
7
Until 1983, most MBSs issued by these three agencies were pass-through
or pay-through obligations. 8 In June 1983, the FHLMC introduced collat-
eralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), a type of mortgage-backed secur-
ity.1 9 Since their introduction, CMOs have garnered an increasing share of
cate holder a proportional interest in the full principal amount of any foreclosed or liquidated
mortgage loan regardless of the monies received. K. LORE, supra note 14, at 2-27.
16. 12 U.S.C. § 24. FHLMC is a corporate instrumentality of the United States pursuant
to title III of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450,
451-58 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). FHLMC purchases first-lien
conventional mortgage loans or participation interests in first-lien mortgage loans and then
resells mortgage loans so purchased in the form of mortgage securities. FHLMC certificates
represent an undivided interest in a pool of fixed-rate, first-lien conventional mortgage loans.
FHLMC guarantees its certificate holders the amount representing the proportionate interest
in interest payments on the mortgage loans in the pool underlying the certificate. FHLMC
also guarantees the ultimate collection of scheduled principal payments, prepayments of prin-
cipal, and the remaining principal balances in the event of foreclosure. K. LORE, supra note
14, at 2-33 to 2-34.
17. MBSs are bonds whose payments are secured by a set of mortgages. See F. FABOZZI,
THE HANDBOOK OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 619 (1985).
18. In pass-through obligations, the agency, as issuer, passes on to its investors the
monthly principal and interest payments made on the mortgage pool. Id. at 1-3, 102, 119-20.
The pass-through represents the investors' beneficial ownership of a fractional undivided inter-
est in the mortgage pool. Id. at 102. Pay-through bonds rely on the cash flow from a mort-
gage pool. Id. at 1-3, 159. The principal and interest payments on the underlying mortgages
are used to pay interest and principal on the bonds. Id. The amortization payments on the
pay-through bonds are generally paid quarterly or semiannually to investors while pass-
through payments are generally made monthly. Id. at 119, 159.
19. CMOs (also known as Fast-Pay/Slow-Pay Bonds or Serialized Mortgage-Backed Se-
curities) are bonds issued by "limited-purpose subsidiaries of investment banking firms, insur-
ance companies, home builders, mortgage bankers, . . . savings and loan assocation[s] and
commercial bank[s]." Id. at 86. Usually, an affiliate organization is set up, through which an
identured trustee issues the bonds. K. LORE, supra note 14, at 3-24. In case of default, re-
course is taken against the affiliate whose assets consist of the underlying mortgages. F.
FABOZZI, supra note 17, at 364. The bonds are serviced by a specific pool of similar mortgages
grouped together into a multiclass prioritization structure of short, medium, and long-term
maturities. Id. at 173. Payments made on the underlying mortgages are used to make
monthly, quarterly, semiannual, or other payments on the bonds. Id. at 160. The exception to
this format is the zero coupon CMO or accreting bond which, during a part of its life, accrues
interest as increased principal rather than as cash paid to an investor. Id. at 177. A given class
of bonds is not redeemed until all of the bonds of an earlier priority are redeemed. Id. at 173.
This prioritization structure provides investors with a reasonable degree of certainty regarding
the cash flow of their investment. Id. at 173, 364.
Proceeds from the sale of CMOs are used to finance future mortgages and other lending
activities. "A bank generally uses cmos [sic] as a source of liquidity in conjunction with its
ownership of mortgage assets; this enables an issuing bank to obtain funds for additional lend-
ing activities." Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse
M. D'Amato (June 18, 1986), at 1 (OCC response).
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the market.2 °
The early 1980's also marked another development in the MBS market.
Before then, the GNMA, the FNMA, and the FHLMC had enjoyed a vir-
tual monopoly on the secondary market in government-backed MBSs. 2 1 In
recent years, however, the private sector has become attracted to both the
primary and secondary mortgage markets by the success of the government
MBSs, including government CMOs, and the apparent demand potential for
housing credit.22 New private sector issuers and investors in this market
include savings institutions, commercial banks, FSLIC-insured mutual sav-
ings banks, state and local retirement funds and investment agencies, and
private pension and life insurance funds.23 Investment banks are presently
the dominant issuers, underwriters, and dealers of government-backed
CMOs.
24
The success of these new government-backed CMOs25 has created great
interest among banks in other securities backed by mortgages. Nevertheless,
because CMOs appear to fall within the Glass-Steagall Act's definition of a
security, 26 there is a significant legal question as to whether these private
20. F. FABOZZI, supra note 17, at 86.
21. K. LORE, supra note 14, at 1-9 to 1-10 (1985).
22. Id. at 2-38.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. In the first nine months of 1986, there were 640 issues of CMOs, totaling $27.81
billion. This is double the $13.46 billion worth of CMOs sold in 1985. See Kreps, Salomon
Brothers Leads Underwriters of Mortgage-Backed Securities for 1986, AM. BANKER, Oct. 10,
1986, at 15. There were a total of $58 billion in MBSs sold in 1986; the 1985 total was $20.6
billion. Taylor, Salomon is Top Underwriter in '86; First Boston Corp. Comes in Second BOND
BUYER, Jan. 5, 1987, at 3.
26. The Glass-Steagall Act does not explicitly define the term "security." In interpreting
"securities" under the Act, the Supreme Court has looked to the definition of "securities" in
other legislation passed at the same time and for purposes similar to the Glass-Steagall Act-
primarily the Securities Act of 1933 definition. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Gover-
nors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 137, 150-52 (1984).
Section 2(1) of the Securities Act of 1933 defines a security as:
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate
of interest or participation in any profit sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate,
preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided inter-
est in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, . . . or, in general, any instrument or instru-
ment commonly known as a "security," or any certificate of interest of participation
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right
to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982).
The Supreme Court has defined an investment contract for purposes of the Securities Act as
a "contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a common enterprise
and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party . . . ." See
[Vol. 36:10251028
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CMOs also fall within the Act's general prohibition on a bank's underwrit-
ing and dealing in securities.2 7 In each of the last three Congresses, banks
have sought explicit statutory authority to issue, underwrite, and deal in pri-
vate CMOs; both those backed by a bank's own mortgages (their own
CMOs), and those backed by the mortgages of other financial institutions
(third-party CMOs).2 8 Thus far, these legislative efforts have been
SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946); see also United Housing Found. v. Forman,
421 U.S. 837 (1975).
The Securities and Exchange Commission has stated that offerings for a whole or fractional
interest in mortgages or deeds of trust frequently constitute an investment contract and, there-
fore, are considered a security within the meaning of the federal securities laws. Public Offer-
ing of Investment Contracts Providing for Acquisitions, Sale or Servicing of Mortgages or
Deeds of Trust, 1 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2755, at 2914-15 (Jan. 31, 1958). The Commis-
sion has defined I 1 attributes which may give rise to the creation of an investment contract.
These are:
(a) Complete investigation and placing service.
(b) Servicing collection, payments, foreclosure, etc.
(c) Implied or express guarantee against loss at any time or providing a market
for the underlying security.
(d) Making advances of funds to protect the security of the investment.
(e) Acceptance of small uniform or continuous investments.
(f) Implied or actual guarantee of specified yield or return.
(g) Continual reinvestment of funds.
(h) Payment of interest prior to actual purchase of the mortgage or trust note.
(i) Providing for fractional interests in mortgages or deeds of trust.
(0) Circumstances which necessitate complete reliance upon the seller, e.g., great
distance between mortgaged property and investor.
(k) Seller's selection of the mortgage or deed of trust for the investor.
Id.
Each of these elements has a bearing on whether there is an investment contract. Id. at
2915. Because CMOs have many of these attributes, a CMO is likely to be considered a secur-
ity under the Glass-Steagall Act.
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 24. The Securities Act of 1933 defines an issuer as "every person who
issues or proposes to issue any security." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(4).
The Banking Act defines an underwriter as any person who has purchased securities from an
issuer with a view towards distribution, or who offers or sells securities for an issuer in connec-
tion with distribution. Id. § 77b(1 1). Underwriting is the process of issuing and initially dis-
tributing securities in an offering to the public. This is also commonly referred to as the
"primary" market.
The Banking Act also defines a dealer as "any person who engages ... as agent, broker, or
principal, in the business of offering, buying, selling . . . or trading in securities. ... Id.
§ 77b(12). Dealing occurs in the "secondary" market and is carried on by persons who buy
and sell securities as principal on exchanges and in the over-the-counter market. The secon-
dary market can also involve the purchase and sale of securities, as agent, by brokers acting for
their customers.
The secondary market enhances the primary market by creating liquidity and flexibility,
thereby increasing the number of investors willing to purchase in the primary market and the
price investors are willing to pay. This, in turn, increases the capital available to the housing
industry. F. FABOZZI, supra note 17, at 15.
28. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 560, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1984). "This authorization will
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unsuccessful.29
As an alternative, banks have brought proposals for additional authority
to underwrite and deal in private CMOs before federal regulatory agencies.3"
These regulatory efforts have been considerably more successful. Indeed, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) recently granted a national
bank permission to issue, underwrite, and deal in CMOs created by the bank
through a banking subsidiary.3'
This Comment will analyze whether, under present law, banks and bank-
ing affiliates have authority to issue, underwrite, and deal in their own and
third-party CMOs. First, it will review relevant sections of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act. It will then analyze the OCC's interpretation of the Act, as well as
relevant case law. The Comment also will consider the policy question of
whether banks should be allowed to deal in secondary mortgage markets,
and will review proposed legislation in this area, making recommendations
concerning that legislation. The Comment will conclude that banks have
authority to issue and to underwrite, but not to deal in, their own CMOs. In
addition, it will conclude that there is no present authority for banks to is-
sue, underwrite, or deal in third-party CMOs. Finally, it will suggest that
Congress should grant banks the authority to underwrite and deal in CMOs
of both types.
I. NATIONAL BANKS AND THE GLASS-STEAGALL ACT
The Banking Act of 1933 was enacted to address the lack of investor con-
fidence resulting from the stock market crash of 1929.32 The four sections
commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act are contained within the
Banking Act of 1933.13 The Act generally provides for the separation of
permit a [Depository Institutions Securities Affiliate (DISA)] to underwrite or deal in what are
commonly referred to as mortgage related obligations." Id.
29. See 1982 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 45; see also 1984 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 274.
30. Proposals have been brought before the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board. See Proposed State-
ment of Policy Special Purpose Finance Subsidiaries,51 Fed. Reg. 12561-62 (1986).
31. Proposal for Bank Subsidiary to Issue, Underwrite, and Deal in Bonds Partially Col-
lateralized by Pools of Mortgages, Comptroller of the Currency No Action Letter No. 86-9,
[Current Transfer Binder], Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (1986 Transfer Binder) 84,015, at
76,114 (May 6, 1986) (Comptroller letter).
The Securities Industry Association has threatened to litigate over the OCC's decision. See
Zigas, SIA to Sue Comptroller on Bank CMO Underwriting, BOND BUYER, July 15, 1986, at 1,
col. 1; SIA and OCC Eyeball to Eyeball Over Bond Distribution of CMOs, BONDWEEK May 11,
1987, at 11.
32. See supra notes 1-11 and accompanying text.
33. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78,
377, 378 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)) (Sections 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the Act are represented in
codified form respectively at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 78, 377, 378 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
1030 [Vol. 36:1025
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commercial and investment banking activities through a series of prohibi-
tions. 4 Section 16 generally prohibits national banks from conducting busi-
ness in certain securities-related activities.35 Similarly, section 21 generally
prohibits securities dealers from engaging in banking activities.16 "Affilia-
tions"37 between organizations which deal in securities and member banks
are generally prohibited under section 20 of the Act.3" Finally, section 32
prohibits interlocking directors, officers, or employees between organizations
"primarily" engaged in securities underwriting and marketing and member
banks.39
Although the Act contains several prohibitions limiting a bank's commer-
cial and securities activities, exemptions are provided that lessen the impact
of the prohibitions. The interpretation of the various prohibitions and ex-
emptions provides a framework for analyzing the authority of banks to un-
derwrite and deal in CMOs.
Section 16 of the Act grants national and state member banks "all such
incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
ing."'  In addition, it sets forth the specific activities in which banks may
engage.4 Along with these specific grants of power, section 16 generally
limits a bank's authority to deal in securities. A bank is permitted to
purchase and sell securities "without recourse [and] solely upon the order
and for the account of customers.",4 2 Therefore, a bank generally may not
purchase or sell securities for its own account.43 Consequently, section 16
34. 74 CONG. REC. 3962, 3963 (1932).
35. 12 U.S.C. § 24. See infra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. For an overview of
securities activities conducted by banks, see Fischer, Gram, Kaufman & Mote, The Securities
Activities of Commercial Banks: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 51 TENN. L. REV. 46-47
(1984).
36. 12 U.S.C. §§ 378(a)(1) (1982); see infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
37. See infra text accompanying note 54 for a definition of the term "affiliation."
38. 12 U.S.C. §§ 377 (1982); see infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
39. 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1982); see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
40. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). State member banks are governed by the same limitations
and conditions as national banks are under § 16 with respect to the purchasing, underwriting,
selling, and holding of investment securities and stocks. Id. § 335.
41. For example, in addition to the GNMAs, FNMAs, and FHLMCs, discussed supra
notes 14-16 and accompanying text, banks are permitted to underwrite, deal in and purchase
for their own accounts obligations of the United States, general obligations of any state or local
or political authority, and securities of certain organizations, such as the obligations of the
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
42. Section 16 provides that "The business of dealing in securities and stock by the associ-
ation shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in no case for its own account
.... 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
43. See id. The statute also provides that "the association shall not underwrite any issue
of securities or stock; Provided, That the association may purchase for its own account invest-
1987] 1031
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generally prohibits banks from underwriting or dealing in securities."
Section 16, however, does contain certain exceptions to the general rule
against underwriting or dealing in securities. The section 16 prohibitions do
not apply to, inter alia, "obligations, participations or other instruments of
or issued by the [FNMA] and the [GNMA], or mortgages, obligations, or
other securities which are or ever have been sold by the [FHLMC].
' 45
Therefore, banks and, indirectly, their affiliates are affirmatively granted the
power to underwrite and sell CMOs guaranteed by the GNMA, the FNMA,
or the FHLMC under section 16 of the Act.46
Of equal importance is section 21 of the Act, which makes it unlawful for
a bank to engage in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distrib-
uting securities while also participating to any extent in the business of re-
ceiving demand deposits.47 Yet this section expressly provides that it does
not affect the right of financial institutions to deal in, underwrite, purchase,
ment securities under such limitations and restrictions as the Comptroller of the Currency may
by regulations prescribe." Id. (emphasis in original). The standards for such investments are
set forth in 12 C.F.R. § 1 (1986). Because this authority does not permit underwriting or
dealing, it is not considered further in this Comment.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 24.
45. Id. The statute provides that
"[t]he limitations and restrictions herein contained as to dealing in, underwriting and
purchasing for its own account, investment securities shall not apply to ... obliga-
tions, participations, or other instruments of or issued by the Federal National Mort-
gage Association, or the Government National Mortgage Association, or mortgages,
obligations or other securities which are or ever have been sold by the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation ... 
Id.
46. Id. Under operating Subsidaries, 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.34(c) and 5.34(d)(2), an operating
subsidiary of a national bank is regulated by the same rules and regulations as the parent bank
and consequently can engage in the same practices of the parent bank. The relevant part of
§ 5.34(c) reads: "A national bank may engage in activities which are a part of or incidental to
the business of banking by means of an operating subsidiary corporation." In order to so
apply, the parent company must own at least 80% of the voting stock of the corporation. 12
C.F.R. § 5.34(c) (1986). The relevant part of § 5.34(d)(2) reads: "Unless otherwise provided
by statute or regulation, all provisions of Federal banking laws and regulations applicable to
the operations of the parent bank shall be equally applicable to the operations of its operating
subsidiaries." 12 C.F.R. § 5.34(d)(2)(i) (1986). State member banks are granted the same
authority as national banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 335 (1982). Section 335 of title 12 reads:
"State member banks shall be subject to the same limitations and conditions with respect to
the purchasing, selling, underwriting, and holding of investment securities and stock as are
applicable in the case of national banks under paragraph 'Seventh' of section 24 of this title."
12 U.S.C. § 335.
47. The statute provides that it is unlawful:
For any person, firm, corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organi-
zation, engaged in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing, at
wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, stocks, bonds, debentures,
notes, or other securities, to engage at the same time to any extent whatever in the
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon presentation of a
1032 [Vol. 36:1025
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or sell investment securities or issue securities to the extent permitted under
section 16.48 For this reason, section 21 is generally considered to be "coex-
tensive" with section 10 9
Section 21 also contains an important affirmative power-a clause permit-
ting banks "to sell, without recourse or agreement to repurchase, obligations
evidencing loans on real estate."5° The legislative history of the Glass-Stea-
gall Act demonstrates that Congress intended for banks to continue selling
mortgages without recourse.5 1
Additionally, section 20 of the Act prohibits a Federal Reserve member
bank from affiliating with a corporation "engaged principally in the issue,
flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities.52
Although Congress failed to define the term "engaged principally" in the
statute, the Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase by examining the stat-
utory definition of "affiliation." 53 Congress defined affiliation as (1) having
direct or indirect ownership or control of more than fifty percent of the vot-
ing stock of an organization; (2) having common ownership; or (3) having a
passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence of debt, or upon request of the
depositor ....
12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1).
48. Section 21 provides in part that "the provisions of this paragraph shall not prohibit
national banks... from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling investment securities,
or issuing securities, to the extent permitted to national banking associations by the provisions
of section 16 of this title .... " Id.
49. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
137, 149 (1984) ("Because § 16 and § 21 seek to draw the same line ... the underwriting
prohibitions described in the two sections are coextensive").
50. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1). The statute provides in part that "nothing in this paragraph
shall be construed as affecting in any way such right as any bank, banking association, savings
bank, trust company, or other banking institution, may otherwise possess to sell, without re-
course or agreement to repurchase, obligations evidencing loans on real estate." Id.
51. [T]he provisions of section 21(a)(l) of the Banking Act of 1933, prohibiting
dealers in securities from engaging in the business of taking deposits, does not pre-
vent banking institutions from dealing in, underwriting, purchasing, and selling in-
vestment securities to the extent expressly permitted to national banks under the
National Banking Act and does not prevent banking institutions from selling mort-
gages without recourse.
Banking Act of 1935: Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 139 (1935) (statement of Mr. O'Connor, Comptroller of the
Currency) (emphasis added).
52. Section 20 provides in part that "no member bank shall be affiliated in any manner...
with any ... organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale,
or distribution . . . of stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities .... " 12 U.S.C.
§ 377. Section 20 also provides specific sanctions that the Federal Reserve Board may impose
at its discretion for violations, including fines of not more than $1,000 per day and the loss of
banking privileges. Id.
53. See Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 447-48
(1947).
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majority of common directors.5 4 The Supreme Court has suggested that
Congress therefore intended majority control in excess of fifty percent to be
necessary before section 20's prohibition becomes effective." Notwithstand-
ing the efforts of the Court to illuminate the meaning of "engaged princi-
pally" by analogy to the term "affiliation," neither Congress nor the Court
has provided an exact definition.
Finally, section 32 of the Act prohibits any officer, director, partner, or
employee of any organization "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, un-
derwriting, public sale, or distribution" of securities from serving at the same
time in a similar capacity with a member bank.5 6 The Supreme Court has
interpreted "primarily engaged" to include any firm whose underwriting
business is substantial (and, therefore, primary), as opposed to the over fifty
percent quantitative test of section 20." An exception to this general prohi-
bition does exist. Section 32 authorizes the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System to allow cross-roles58 when, in the judgment of the
Board, "it would not unduly influence the investment policies of [a] member
bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments. 5 9
Viewed as a whole, the Glass-Steagall Act generally prohibits banks from
directly underwriting and dealing in most securities. There are, however,
important exceptions to these prohibitions that are crucial to the ability of
banks to engage in CMO-related activities. The general prohibition, and
these specific exceptions, are the framework within which the question of
bank CMO activities must be analyzed.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 221(a) (1982); Agnew, 329 U.S. at 447 n.4.
55. See Agnew, 329 U.S. at 448.
56. Section 32 provides:
No officer, director, or employee of any corporation or unincorporated association,
no partner or employee of any partnership, and no individual, primarily engaged in
the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or distribution, at wholesale or retail,
or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds, or other similar securities, shall
serve the same time as an officer, director, or employee of any member bank except in
limited classes of cases in which the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System may allow such service by general regulations when in the judgment of the
said Board it would not unduly influence the investment policies of such member
bank or the advice it gives its customers regarding investments.
12 U.S.C. § 78.
57. Agnew, 329 U.S. at 449.
58. Cross-roles refer to interlocks between officers, directors, or employees of an entity
primarily engaged in securities and a member bank. See supra note 56.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 78; see supra note 56 and accompanying text. The Board has imple-
mented its authority by adopting Regulation R. See Relations with Dealers in Securities under
§ 32, Banking Act of 1933, 12 C.F.R. § 218 (1986).
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II. AUTHORITY TO UNDERWRITE AND DEAL IN BANK'S OWN CMOs:
THE LIBERTY NORSTAR BANK OF BUFFALO DECISION
The market for CMO's holds considerable potential." Consequently,
banks want to be able to issue, underwrite, and deal in CMOs backed by the
mortgages that they create, as well as CMOs backed by mortgages that are
sold by other institutions, regardless of whether the mortgages are bank-
eligibles. Bank eligibles are mortgages which banks are expressly permitted
to issue, underwrite and deal in under the Glass-Steagall Act. Thus, despite
the Act's general prohibition against banks' underwriting and dealing in se-
curities, a strong financial incentive has prompted banks to seek such au-
thority from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the federal
regulatory body that supervises national banks.6 1
In April of 1985, the Liberty Norstar Bank of Buffalo applied to the OCC
for permission to issue, underwrite, and deal in its own CMOs.62 The bank's
proposal included the creation of a subsidiary, which through an indenture
with a nonaffiliated trustee,6 3 was to "issue bonds to be paid off in scheduled
principal and interest payments at a fixed rate of interest."'  These bonds
were to be collateralized by GNMA, FNMA, and FHLMC certificates and/
or "nonfederally insured conventional residential mortgage loans," or any
combination thereof.
6 5
Under the proposal, in the event of a default the trustee and/or bondhold-
ers would have recourse against the subsidiary, whose assets would consist
solely of the collateral pledged to secure the bonds.66 A standard indenture
would be executed in which the evidence of ownership of the underlying
mortgages would be pledged to a trustee. Payments made on the certificates
60. For example, in 1985 there were 86 issues of CMOs worth $15.5 billion. See K. LORE,
supra note 14, at 2-3 (citing Hustic & McDaniel, Major Developments in Housing and Mort-
gage Finance in 1985, SALOMON BROTHERS INC. BOND MARKET RES., Jan. 1986, at 13).
61. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
62. Proposal for Bank Subsidiary to Issue, Underwrite, and Deal in Bonds Partially Collat-
eralized by Pools of Mortgages, [Current Transfer Binder], Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (1986
Transfer Binder ) 84,015, at 76,614 (May 22, 1986) [hereinafter Proposal Letter].
63. The bank's indenture with a nonaffiliated trustee was established under the Trust In-
denture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbb (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Proposal Letter,
supra note 62, at 76,614. Thus, the record owner of the certificates is the indentured trustee
even though the rights of the CMO holders are protected as if they were the owners of the
loans.
64. Proposal Letter, supra note 62, at 76,614.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 76,715. No recourse would be had against the bank since the bank would not
have reservable liability with the bond under Regulation D of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, Reserve Requirements of Depository Institutions, 12 C.F.R. §§ 204.1 to
204.124 (1986).
1987] 1035
Catholic University Law Review
and for the underlying mortgages would be received directly by the trustee
as the record owner of the certificates. The trustee would reinvest accumu-
lated underlying mortgage principal and interest payments until such time as
they were to be distributed to the bondholders. 67 The bank subsidiary then
would be entitled to any monies still held by the trustee, free from any lien of
the applicable indenture, after payments to the bondholders.68
In response to Liberty Norstar's request, the OCC issued a brief interpre-
tive "no-action" letter 69 that stated that the OCC would not raise any objec-
tion to the bank or its subsidiary issuing, underwriting, or dealing in the
bank's own CMOs as set forth in the proposal letter.70 The OCC based its
conclusion on the facts and representations set forth in the bank's submitted
opinions and supporting submissions: a June 10, 1985 telephone conversa-
tion between counsel for the bank, counsel for the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and counsel for the OCC; and the legal opinion of the bank's
counsel that the activities of the bank's subsidiaries would not violate federal
banking law.7' The OCC no-action letter did not include any independent
legal analysis.
Soon after the OCC decision, the Comptroller's Office received an inquiry
from Senator Alfonse D'Amato regarding the Liberty Norstar decision.72 In
a letter to the Comptroller dated June 3, 1986, Senator D'Amato, the Chair-
man of the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Bank-
ing, Housing and Urban Affairs, criticized the OCC's decision and raised
concerns about the limited legal analysis contained in the OCC's no-action
letter.7 3 Senator D'Amato requested that the OCC submit to the subcom-
mittee the legal analysis not contained in the Liberty Norstar no-action
letter.74
The OCC consequently prepared a legal memorandum that set forth the
reasoning underlying its Liberty Norstar decision. In that memorandum, the
67. Until the payments were made to the bondholders, the interest profit would accrue to
the bank. The trustee invests the funds, pending distribution to bondholders, in instruments
permitted for the direct investment by banks in accordance with Banking Bulletin BB-83-58, at
49,102. See Proposal Letter, supra note 62, at 76,614-15.
68. Id.
69. A bank may request the OCC to rule on the application of the Act to securities which
the bank holds or desires to purchase as an investment security for the bank, or which the bank
holds or desires to deal in, underwrite, purchase, hold or sell as a security. Requests for Rul-
ings, 12 C.F.R. § 1.9 (1986).
70. Proposal Letter, supra note 62, at 76,614.
71. Id.
72. Letter from Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato to Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Cur-





OCC stated that the Liberty Norstar decision was based on a long line of
OCC precedent recognizing the authority of national banks to transfer their
mortgages and mortgage-related assets in transactions substantially similar
to those proposed by Liberty Norstar.75 The OCC viewed a CMO broadly:
as "a bond, or other obligation or evidence of indebtedness representing the
transfer of an interest in an underlying mortgage, pool of mortgages or mort-
gage-related obligations."' 76 Based on this broad definition, the Comptroller
argued that the transfer of a CMO by a bank could be characterized either as
a sale of an interest in real estate or as a borrowing-both permissible activi-
ties under the Glass-Steagall Act.77
A. Underwriting CMOs: Sale of an Interest in Real Estate
The OCC based its Liberty Norstar ruling in part on its 1977 Bank of
America decision relating to pass-through obligations.78 In that decision, the
OCC authorized Bank of America to sell pass-through participations in a
pool of the bank's mortgages which consisted of conventional real estate
loans on single-family homes.7 9 The OCC based its decision on the section
21 proviso that allows for the sale, without recourse or agreement to repur-
chase, of obligations evidencing loans on real estate.8°
75. See Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse M.
D'Amato (June 18, 1986) at 1.
76. See id.
77. See id. Although the OCC mentioned that the transaction could be viewed as the
receipt of deposits, nowhere in its decision did the OCC explain the theory or its application to
the facts.
78. National Bank Allowed to Sell Mortgage-Backed Securities, [1973-1978 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 97,093, at 82,369 (Mar. 30, 1977) [hereinafter Bank of
America].
79. Id.
80. Id. Previous OCC interpretations of §§ 16 and 21 allowed national banks to repur-
chase and sell real estate loans, pass-through certificates representing real estate loans and
bonds backed by real estate loans. Because it would be repurchasing and selling obligations
evidencing loans on real estate, the bank would not be prohibited from selling CMOs, both
eligible and ineligible, under section 21. See National Bank May Underwrite and Deal in Cer-
tain Mortgage-Backed Pass-Through Certificates, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) $ 85,421, at 77,543 (April 12, 1983) [hereinafter National Bank May Underwrite]
(relying on a § 16 exemption which allows national banks to underwrite or deal in obligations
insured by the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, and § 21 which does not affect
any other rights a bank may have "to sell without recourse or agreement to repurchase obliga-
tions evidencing loans on real estate.") This case is especially significant since it dealt with the
purchase and sale of pass-through certificates in pools of mortgages, which were not originated
by the bank, but rather were purchased by the trading bank. Id.; Bank of America, supra note
78, at 82,371 (allowing Bank of America to sell participations in pools of the bank's mort-
gages). The Comptroller's decision noted that the § 21 exemption for banks to sell without
recourse or agreement to repurchase, underscored the "evident intent of Congress not to dis-
turb the secondary market for real estate loans made by financial institutions." Id.; see also
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In the Bank ofAmerica decision, the OCC took the position that the pass-
through participations were actually a sale of certain bank assets; specifi-
cally, conventional mortgage loans.8 In later decisions, the OCC expanded
on this theory: where the participations are structured as pass-throughs, the
participation holders have the same rights, liabilities and risks as if they
owned the loans directly.82 Because of this structure, the OCC considers
pass-throughs to be "legally transparent. ' 83 Therefore, according to the
Comptroller, because section 21 authorized national banks to purchase and
sell real estate loans,84 national banks are also authorized to sell pass-
through certificates representing a participation in a pool of such loans.
Thus, for purposes of the Glass-Steagall Act, the sale of the interests in
pass-throughs did not alter the basic character of the transaction: the sale of
assets from the bank's mortgage-related portfolio.86  The OCC also con-
cluded that the bank was not "in the business" of issuing or underwriting
within the meaning of section 21 of the Act.87 The OCC noted that it was
Bank Proposal to Issue Certificates Representing Undivided Interests in a Trust Fund Consisting
in Part of Certain Mortgage Loans Originated by Bank, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,415, at 77,527 (Sept. 17, 1982); Additional Issuance of Mortgage-
Backed Pass-Through Securities Consisting of Second Mortgages Allowed, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,275, at 77,413 (May 29, 1981); Commitment to
Make Option Loans in Mortgage Pools Is Not Indebtedness on the Part of the Bank to Holders
of the Pass-Through Certificates, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,186, at 77,198 (July 13, 1979); Bank's Contingent Exposure on Mortgage Pool Certificates
Subject to Lending Limit Statute, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
85,167, at 77,171 (April 20, 1979) ("[I]ssuance and sale of mortgage-backed pass-through se-
curities is permissible ... and ... assure[s] the continuation of home mortgage lending by
commercial banks."); Collateral Trust Certificates Issued by Subsidiary of National Bank-
Undivided Interests in Pool of Mortgages, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 85,144, at 77,141 (Oct. 17, 1978) (The fact that § 21(a)(l) does not affect other rights
of a bank to sell without recourse or agreement to repurchase "signifies Congressional ap-
proval of measures designed to encourage a liquid secondary market for real estate mort-
gages."); Investment Restrictions on Securities Under Proposed Conventional Mortgage-Backed
Pass-Through Certificates Program, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
84,116, at 77,113 (May 18, 1978); Private Placement of Certificates Representing Undivided
Interests in Pools of Conventional Mortgages, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L.
Rep. (CCH) 85,100, at 77,096 (Feb. 14, 1978).
81. Bank of America, supra note 78, at 82,371.
82. National Bank May Underwrite, supra note 80, at 77,543 (April 12, 1983) (letter of
Chief Counsel Brian W. Smith). The transparency theory was implicitly recognized as a legiti-
mate concept in the Senate report to the Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of
1984. See S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2809, 2810-11.
83. See generally National Bank May Underwrite, supra note 80, at 77,543.
84. See supra note 50.
85. Bank of America, supra note 78, at 82,371.
86. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 47.
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doubtful that the issuance of nonrecourse, large denomination certificates
backed by mortgages on a frequent basis, would be enough to demonstrate
that the bank's subsidiary was engaged "in the business" of issuing or selling
securities in the same sense as investment banking firms issue and sell securi-
88ties. 8 Consequently, the OCC ruled that Bank of America had authority
under the Act to conduct its pass-through activities.89
The OCC did not view the Liberty Norstar proposal as different in any
material respect from Bank of America or similar OCC precedent.90 The
CMOs to be issued by Liberty Norstar were backed by conventional mort-
gage loans and structured as pass-throughs. The holders of the certificates
would have the same rights, risks, and liabilities as if they were the direct
owners of the loans.9" Therefore, the OCC ruled that the CMOs were a
permissible sale of the bank's assets that were designed in all material re-
spects as a pass-through which had already been approved by the OCC.92
The OCC relied on the legislative history of the section 21 proviso 93 as
additional support for the authority of banks to underwrite their own
CMOs. 94 The OCC has long held that section 21 authorizes national banks
to purchase and sell real estate loans, as well as pass-through certificates95
representing such loans. 96 Consequently, the OCC concluded that the sale
88. Bank of America, supra note 78, at 82,369.
89. Collateral Trust Certificates Issued by Subsidiary of National Bank: Undivided Inter-
ests in Pool of Mortgages, [1973-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 85,144,
at 77,141 (Oct. 17, 1978).
90. Proposal Letter, supra note 62, at 76,615.
91. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
92. Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse M.
D'Amato (June 18, 1986) at 6.
93. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
94. The proviso was intended to "increase the ability of the banks to serve their communi-
ties, to provide a greater outlet for the banks' funds, and to promote business recovery by
opening up the mortgage market and reviving the construction industry." H.R. REP. No. 742,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1935). The House recognized that, unlike other loans, real estate
loans have suffered historically because "there was no organized market where they could be
sold even at a reduced price." Id. at 15.
It should be noted the OCC that has used this House quotation regarding the legislative
intent of the § 21 proviso out of context. The OCC citation is directed at a legislative discus-
sion of whether banks should be allowed to make loans on real estate. See id. at 14-15.
95. See supra note 80.
96. See National Bank May Underwrite, supra note 80 at 77,543 (April 12, 1983). In this
decision, the OCC held that a national bank could underwrite and deal in pass-through certifi-
cates, a predecessor of the CMO. The mortgage-backed pass-through certificates evidenced
undivided interests in pools of project mortgage loans insured by the Federal Housing Associa-
tion (FHA) and sold by the GNMA. Id. at 77,543. The pools were structured according to
both FHA regulations and a pooling and servicing agreement. Id.
In so holding, the OCC relied on the § 16 exemption for obligations insured by the Secretary
of Housing and Urban Development from the general prohibition on underwriting and dealing
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of the interest in the mortgages did not alter the basic characteristic of
the transaction: the bank's sale of instruments in its mortgage-related
portfolio.9 7
The OCC also found that Liberty Norstar's proposed CMO activities
would not violate either section 20 or section 32 of the Act.9" In instances
where the underlying pool of mortgages would contain conventional mort-
gages from the bank's portfolio, Liberty Norstar agreed to abide by section
3(c)(5)(C) of the Investment Company Act of 1940."9 That provision ex-
empts from the Glass-Steagall Act's definition of "investment company"
those entities not engaged in the business of issuing redeemable securities,
installment type face-amount, and periodic payment plan certificates; and
those entities that are primarily engaged in mortgages, leins on, and interests
in securities." ° By qualifying for this exemption, the OCC reasoned, Lib-
erty Norstar would not be "primarily engaged" in securities underwriting
for purposes of section 32.101 Because the test for engaging in securities ac-
tivities is more stringent under section 32, the bank a priori could not be in
violation of section 20.102
The bank's proposal also contained various safeguards to protect both it-
self and its investors. For example, Liberty Norstar agreed to file a registra-
tion statement with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933.' The Securities Act requires that
all publicly offered securities be registered with the SEC and that a detailed
in securities. Id. The loans placed in the pools were insured according to the exemption found
in § 16, and were therefore found to be exempt. The OCC also found the pass-through certifi-
cates to be exempt. Id. Each certificate represented an undivided interest in the pool of ex-
empted loans. The pooling and servicing agreement obligated the servicer to remit all
payments and collections above the amount of the service fee to the certificate holders. The
servicer was also obligated to pursue on behalf of the certificate holders any rights against the
Department of Housing and Urban Development. Id. Thus, the OCC held that the pool was
not the obligor of the underlying loans but was merely a pass-through vehicle. Id. at 77,544.
Therefore, because the pool was not legally transparent in all respects material to § 16, and
because the pass-through certificates were not substantially different from the underlying
loans, the certificates were found to be exempt from § 16 under the same provision which
exempted the loans. Id.
97. Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse M.
D'Amato (June 18, 1986) at 5.
The OCC clarified that they were only approving the bank's use of its own mortgages as
collateral. "The activity in question amounts only to a transfer by the banks of its own mort-
gage assets and obligations." Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
98. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
99. See Proposal Letter, supra note 62, at 76,614.
100. Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a(3)(c)(5)(C) (1982).
101. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 55, 57, and accompanying text.
103. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
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prospectus be delivered to all prospective investors."0 The bank also agreed
to have the quality of its CMOs rated by an independent agency. Bank-
eligible CMOs are backed by the United States, either implicitly or explic-
itly.'0 5 The government guarantee of GNMAs, FNMAs, and FHLMCs
makes bank-eligible CMOs virtually riskless. Nongovernment securities, in-
cluding private CMOs, may be rated by rating agencies such as Moody's or
Standard and Poor's so that investors will have a recognizable standard by
which to judge each issuance. The bank agreed that its CMOs would have
an AAA rating, the highest bond rating possible, to safeguard investors. 16
To further protect investors under the Liberty Norstar proposal, in case of
nonpayment, the trustee would be required to seek payments from appropri-
ate obligors on behalf of the bondholders pursuant to the Trust Indenture
Act,10 7 thereby providing bond-holders with the same rights, liabilities, and
risks as if they were direct owners.'0 8 The bank was also protected by un-
derwriting its CMOs through a bank subsidiary whose assets would consist
solely of the CMOs and underlying mortgages. In case of nonpayment, the
indentured trustee bond-holders would have recourse only against the bank
subsidiary; the trustee would have no recourse against the bank. Therefore,
no bank assets would be "at risk. ' 09
B. Underwriting CMOs: Borrowing of Funds
The OCC also based its Liberty Norstar decision in part on a bank's au-
thority to borrow funds."' Section 16 allows national banks to exercise "all
such incidental powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of bank-
104. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982). Securities issued by the GNMA, the FNMA, and the
FHLMC are exempt from the registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77(d) (1982).
105. See supra notes 14-16.
106. For information on how the investment rating services rate CMOs and other mort-
gage-backed securities as investments, see Moody's Approach to Rating Mortgage-Backed Se-
curities, 76 MOODY's BOND SURVEY 4331 (1984).
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77aaa-77bbbb. Under the Trust Indenture Act, debt securities may not be
sold to the public unless they are issued pursuant to a trust indenture. This Act requires the
trustee to notify all holders of any default within 90 days. Id. at § 77bbb(b). The trustee must
have authority to recover judgments and to file proofs of claims in judicial proceedings upon
default. Id. at § 77qqq(a).
108. For an analysis of the legal and financial issues raised by mortgage-backed securities
generally and possible safeguards from risk, see Murray & Hadaway, Mortgage-Backed Securi-
ties: An Investigation of Legal and Financial Issues, 11 J. CORP. L. 203 (1986).
109. Proposal for Bank Subsidiary to Issue, Underwrite, and Deal in Bonds Partially Collat-
eralized by Pools of Mortgages, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) (1986
Transfer Binder), 1 84,015, at 76,614-15 (May 22, 1986).
110. Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse D'Amato
(June 18, 1986) at 5-6.
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ing." " The OCC concluded that where the CMOs are not an outright sale
of the bank's interest in real estate, they may be viewed as a borrowing of
funds by the bank which uses the underlying securities as collateral. Ac-
cording to the OCC, this borrowing is permitted by the Glass-Steagall Act as
an incidental power." 2
The OCC's no-action letter authorized Liberty Norstar to issue, under-
write, and deal in CMOs."' At no point in either the no-action letter or the
OCC's response to Senator D'Amato did the OCC set forth any legal analy-
sis demonstrating the authority for the bank to deal in CMOs."
4
III. THE COMPTROLLER'S DECISION REGARDING LIBERTY NORSTAR
BANK'S UNDERWRITING IS CORRECT
Despite the obvious importance of the issues addressed in the Liberty Nor-
star decision, the OCC produced a no-action letter that is completely devoid
of legal analysis. Even in response to a demand for a legal justification from
Senator D'Amato," 5 the OCC still produced only a minimal, superficial
legal analysis to support its decision.
Although it is not apparent from the OCC ruling, a careful review of the
Glass-Steagall Act, as well as case law interpreting the Act, reveals sufficient
statutory authority to support the OCC's determination that banks may un-
derwrite both bank-eligible and their own CMOs. Nevertheless, the same
analysis will show that, contrary to the OCC's conclusion, there is no au-
thority for banks to deal in other than bank-eligible CMOs.
A. Underwriting a Bank's Own CMOs
There are three rationales supporting a bank's authority to underwrite its
own CMOs. Two of those bases-the power of banks to sell interests in real
estate, and to borrow funds-are addressed in the OCC opinion.' 16 A third
111. 12 U.S.C. § 24.
112. See Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse M.
D'Amato (June 18, 1986) at 5-6; see also 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). ("[Banks] shall have power
... [t]o exercise by its board of directors.., all such incidental powers as shall be necessary to
carry on the business of banking.")
113. See Proposal for Bank Subsidiary To Issue, Underwrite, and Deal in Bonds Partially
Collateralized by Pools of Mortgages, [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
(1986 Transfer Binder) 84,015, at 76,614-15 (May 22, 1986).
114. See generally Proposal Letter, supra note 62; Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptrol-
ler of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato (June 18, 1986).
115. See supra notes 72 & 74 and accompanying text.
116. See generally Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen.
Alfonse M. D'Amato (June 18, 1986).
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rationale not considered by the OCC, a bank's authority to liquify its hold-
ings under the incidental powers clause, also supports this conclusion.
1. Sale of an Interest in Real Estate
Sections 16 and 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act are to be read harmoni-
ously. 1 17 Section 16 specifically authorizes a bank to deal in, underwrite,
and purchase for its own account obligations of the United States, including
GNMAs, FNMAs, and FHLMCs." 8 Section 21 also authorizes banks to
sell, without recourse or agreement to repurchase, obligations evidencing
loans on real estate."1 9 As the OCC decision correctly noted, the legislative
history of section 21 makes clear that the section was not meant to bar banks
from selling mortgage securities on a nonrecourse basis. 2' Therefore, if a
security fits into the section 21 exception, it will not be barred by section 16.
An interest in a CMO is actually an interest in the mortgages that have
been pooled to provide additional protection for the investor.' 2 ' The OCC
has determined that national banks may purchase and hold investment com-
pany shares without limitation if the underlying portfolio, which consists
wholly of bank-eligible obligations, is itself an eligible obligation. 122 Under
the OCC transparency theory, therefore, where a CMO is backed by bank-
eligible mortgages, the CMO is also bank-eligible. 123 Under section 21,
banks are permitted to sell, "without recourse or agreement to repurchase,
obligations evidencing loans on real estate." 124 Consequently, where a CMO
is backed by mortgages made eligible under section 21, banks should be per-
mitted to sell such securities without violating the provisions of the Glass-
Steagall Act.' 25 Because under section 21 banks are permitted to sell their
own mortgages,' 26 they should also be permitted to sell CMOs backed by
their own mortgages.
The Comptroller's Liberty Norstar position on underwriting is also consis-
tent with long-standing OCC precedent. For close to a decade, the OCC has
allowed banks to sell pass-through participations in a pool of the bank's
117. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
119. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
120. Section 21(a)(1) "does not permit banking institutions from selling mortgages without
recourse." Hearings Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 113 (1935).
121. See K. LORE, supra note 14, at 3-18.
122. Comptroller of the Currency, National Bank Investment in Investment Companies
Composed Wholly of Bank Eligible Investment (Banking Circular 220) (Nov. 21, 1986).
123. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
124. 12 U.S.C. § 378(a)(1) (1982); see supra note 50 and accompanying text.
125. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
126. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
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mortgages under the authority of section 21.127 An analysis of Liberty Nor-
star's proposal to sell CMOs is comparable in all material respects to those
pass-throughs already approved by the Comptroller.
2 The Borrowing of Funds
The OCC justifiably relied on bank authority to borrow funds under the
"incidental powers" clause of the Banking Act of 1933128 in deciding Liberty
Norstar. The Supreme Court granted banks the authority to borrow funds
and to incur debt as early as 1875. In First National Bank v. National Ex-
change Bank, 129 the Supreme Court defined the term "incidental powers" as
those powers required to meet the legitimate demands of the authorized
business of banks, as well as enabling the bank to conduct its affairs safely
and prudently within the confines of its charter.13 The Court concluded
that this definition necessarily implied "the right of a bank to incur liabilities
in the regular course of its business" and to become the creditor of others. 13 1
The Court has consistently upheld the right of a bank to borrow
money.1 32 Congress expanded this right in 1982 by removing the limitations
previously placed on the amount a bank could borrow. 133 Thus, there is
authority to support the OCC's view that CMO's are the authorized borrow-
ing of funds by a bank without limitation as to amount.
3. Liquidity as an Incidental Power
There is yet another ground, although not addressed by the OCC in its
decision, that supports a bank's authority to underwrite private CMOs.
Banks are authorized to perform any activity "necessary to carry on the
business of banking"134 through the incidental powers clause.' 35 In order to
fall within the clause, the banking activity must be convenient or useful in
connection with the bank's performance of one of its express powers. 1 36 One
such recognized incidental power is the power to maintain liquidity of as-
127. See supra notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
128. Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933).
129. 92 U.S. 122 (1875).
130. Id. at 127.
131. Id.
132. See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S.
137, 158 n.11 (1984); Wyman v. Wallace, 201 U.S. 230, 243 (1906); Aldrich v. Chemical Nat'l
Bank, 176 U.S. 618, 626-28 (1900); Auten v. United States Nat'l Bank, 174 U.S. 125, 141-43
(1899).
133. Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, 12 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
135. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
136. Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972).
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sets.1 3 7 One means by which national banks may maintain liquidity is the
"sale of mortgages and 'other evidences of debt' " acquired through loan or
discount with a view toward reinvestment. 138 Under this analysis, a bank
may underwrite its own CMO's because these transactions are a source of
liquidity permitted under the incidental powers provision. This avenue of
liquidity is particularly important in view of the deregulation that is occur-
ring in the banking industry.
The high interest rates of the 1970's played a large role in the deregulation
of banks. As interest rates rose, investors left banks who were limited by law
in the amount of interest they could pay to depositors, and invested their
money in securities firms whose interest rates were not regulated. 39 In re-
sponse to the resulting loss of business experienced by banks, Congress de-
regulated the banking industry."4
Due to deregulation, banks must now pay market-rate interest to their
depositors in order to stay competitive.' 4 ' At the same time, the interest
rates that banks are collecting from outstanding loans are the same rates that
were negotiated at the time the loan was given.' 4 2 Consequently, banks are
forced to pay competitive interest rates while still earning the prederegula-
tion interest rates on long-term loans which are their traditional source of
income. 143 To make up for the disparity between the price they are forced to
pay in interest on deposits and the amount of interest being collected on
long-term loans, banks are turning to the securitization of their assets and
the sale of those assets in the market. 144
137. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (First), (Seventh); see also First Nat'l Bank v. National Exch.
Bank, 92 U.S. 122 (1875); Comment, Expansion of National Bank Powers: Regulatory and
Judicial Precedent Under the National Bank Act, Glass-Steagall Act, and Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, 37 Sw. L.J. 765, 768 (1982).
138. First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 560 (1927).
139. See Solomon, Banks of Tomorrow, NAT'L J., Sept. 13, 1986, at 2160, 2162 (discussing
the impact of technology on banks in the future); see also Loring & Brundy, The Deregulation
of Banks, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 347 (1985).
140. The deregulation of the banking industry began in 1978 when the Federal Reserve
Board authorized certificate deposits with an interest rate determined by weekly Treasury Bill
rates. See Maximum Rates of Interest Payable, 12 C.F.R. § 217.7 (1978). The deregulation
continued in 1980 when Congress created the Depository Institutions Deregulations Commit-
tee to produce a plan to eliminate interest rate controls. See Depository Institutions Deregula-
tion Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 142 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3501-
3524 (1982)).
141. Loring & Brundy, supra note 149, at 351.
142. See G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW,
§ 11.4, at 672-74 (1979) [hereinafter G. OSBORNE].
143. Id. Mortgage lending institutions' main source of income is their mortgage portfolios.
Id.
144. See Solomon, supra note 149, at 2162.
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The authority for banks to securitize their assets is found in the incidental
powers clause of section 16.145 The Supreme Court has interpreted the inci-
dental powers clause to permit the sale of mortgages "acquired by way of
loan or discount with a view [toward] reinvestment .... ,,146 Because banks
may sell the underlying mortgages, under the transparency theory147 they
should also be permitted to sell pass-throughs representing the underlying
mortgages.
Similar authority is found in the incidental powers clause itself. In order
for a power to be incidental, the activity in question must be convenient or
useful in connection with a permissible activity under the Glass-Steagall
Act. 14 8 For example, banks are permitted to own and lease personal prop-
erty if the leasing arrangements are the functional equivalent of long-term
loans in which the bank retains a security interest in the property through
legal ownership. 149
This same analysis may be applied to underwriting CMOs. Securitization
of a bank's own mortgages is needed to keep banks liquid and competitive in
today's market.15 ° Therefore it is arguable that underwriting CMOs,
whether eligible or ineligible, is a permissible activity under the Act because
it is convenient and useful to the business of banking, and because banks
need to remove these long-term assets from their balance sheets.
4. Deference as a Factor
Although not a substantial factor in reviewing the OCC's action, the def-
erence that the judiciary normally affords agency decisions suggests that the
Liberty Norstar no-action letter would be upheld if challenged in court. The
Supreme Court has held that, in reviewing past OCC decisions, the position
taken by the Comptroller should be given great deference.' 5 1 This judicial
deference is conditioned upon close examination of the language, history,
and purposes of the Act in view of the proposed activity.' 52 Generally,
courts will defer to the agency charged with the enforcement of a statute
145. See supra notes 40-44.
146. First Nat'l Bank v. Hartford, 273 U.S. 548, 560 (1927).
147. See supra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.
148. M & M Leasing Corp. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 563 F.2d 1377, 1382 (9th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 956 (1978); Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st
Cir. 1972).
149. M & M Leasing Corp., 563 F.2d at 1382.
150. See Solomon, supra note 139, at 2162. For a discussion of securitization, see Pavel,
Securitization, 8 ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 16 (1984).
151. See Clarke v. Securities Indus. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 790, 797-98 (1987).
152. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Investment Co. Inst., 450 U.S. 46, 56
(1981); see also Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807
F.2d 1052, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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where the agency has adopted a reasonable construction of the regulatory
statute. 53 The courts' deference is based on the OCC's specialization in
these issues. 154 The OCC's judgment would be overturned only if there was
no reasonable basis to sustain the opinion, or if the OCC exercised its judg-
ment in a manner which clearly exceeded its statutory authority.1
55
Thus, the OCC's decision to permit Liberty Norstar to underwrite its own
CMOs is supported by the sale of an interest in real estate theory, 56 the
borrowing of funds theory,"' and the liquidity theory. 158 Because each of
these theories is a reasonable basis for the OCC decision, it is likely that the
Liberty Norstar decision on underwriting and issuing, if challenged in court,
would be upheld.
B. The Comptroller's Decision Permitting Liberty Norstar Bank to Deal in
its Own CMOs Is Incorrect
In addition to authorizing Liberty Norstar to underwrite its own CMOs,
the OCC also summarily granted the bank authority to deal in its own
CMOs.' 5 9 Contrary to the OCC's Liberty Norstar decision, there is no au-
thority in the Glass-Steagall Act that would permit banks to deal in their
own CMOs." ° Additionally, although not addressed by the OCC in the
Liberty Norstar decision, there is no authority in the Act which would per-
mit banks to underwrite or deal in third-party CMOs.'
6'
The concept of dealing requires both the ability to purchase and the ability
to sell.' 62 Thus, in order to deal in CMOs, the bank must be able to sell and
purchase CMOs in the secondary mortgage market. While there is authority
in the Glass-Steagall Act that allows banks to sell CMOs, the Act contains
no authority that would permit banks to purchase CMOs.' 6
153. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27 (1971).
154. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys. v. Agnew, 329 U.S. 441, 450 (1947)
(Rutledge, J., concurring). "Their specialized experience gives them an advantage judges can-
not possibly have, not only in dealing with the problems raised for their discretion by the
system's working, but also in ascertaining the meaning Congress had in mind in prescribing
the standards by which they should administer it." Id.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text.
157. See supra notes 128-33 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
159. Proposal Letter, supra note 62, at 76,614.
160. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
161. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh).
162. Under the Securities Act of 1933, a dealer is defined as any person who is "in the
business of offering, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing or trading in securities issued by
another person." See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(12) (1982); see also Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(5) (1982).
163. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
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None of the rationales supporting a bank's authority to underwrite CMOs
applies to the question of purchasing. In contrast to the selling of CMOs,
the purchasing of CMOs cannot be characterized either as a sale of the
bank's interest in real estate or as a borrowing of funds. Moreover, a bank's
purchasing of CMOs cannot be characterized as a method of liquifying the
bank's long-term assets. Such a purchase does not liquify the bank's assets.
Indeed, the bank would be trading its liquid assets for a long-term asset.
Therefore, purchasing CMOs is prohibited by section 16 because there is no
exception found in the Act which would take the purchase of CMOs out of
section 16's general prohibition against purchasing securities for their own
account."6 If banks are not allowed to purchase CMOs, they lack the abil-
ity to both purchase and sell CMOs and therefore are precluded from deal-
ing in CMOs.
165
Banks are precluded from underwriting, or dealing in third-party CMOs
under the same theory that prohibits banks from dealing in their own
CMOs. 16 6 In order to underwrite or deal in third-party CMOs, the bank
must first purchase the third-party CMOs in the secondary mortgage mar-
ket. Because banks are specifically prohibited from purchasing CMOs for




Based on an analysis of the Glass-Steagall Act and case law interpreting
the Act, it is clear that although banks may underwrite both bank-eligible
and their own CMOs, there is no authority for them to underwrite third-
party CMOs or to deal in other than bank-eligible CMOs. Legislation is
needed to expand bank powers in this area.
The question whether banks can issue, underwrite, and deal in CMOs has
received considerable attention in recent legislation, proposed legislation,
and congressional committee reports. 168 This legislative material sheds con-
siderable light on the public policy issues underlying national bank participa-
164. Id.
165. Banks do possess authority to buy mortgages in the secondary mortgage market. See
Secondary Mortgage Market Enhancement Act of 1984, 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh). Therefore,
a bank could conceivably buy third-party mortgages for the bank's portfolio. These mortgages
could then be packaged and sold as the bank's own CMOs. Thus, a bank could, through this
circuitous method, avoid the prohibition against dealing in third-party CMOs. See infra note
169 and accompanying text.
166. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
167. See supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
168. See infra notes 171, 175, & 187.
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tion in the CMO markets.169 The congressional committees that have
reviewed these issues appear to agree that banks should have expanded au-
thority in this area.' 7 °
Congress has repeatedly come close to passing legislation that would grant
further authority for banks to issue, underwrite, and deal in CMOs. In 1984,
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs (the Senate
Committee) submitted the Financial Services Competitive Equity Act of
1984 (the 1984 Act) to the full Senate.' 7 ' The 1984 Act was "designed to
clarify and revise the statutory framework under which financial institutions
operate and compete,"' 72 and gave bank holding companies and their sub-
sidiaries new power to underwrite and deal in mortgage-backed securities. '73
In proposing the 1984 Act, the Senate Committee expressed concern for the
liquidity of national banks in today's market. 74
The House Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs (the
House Committee) noted that it had considered carefully the implications of
permitting depository institution holding companies to underwrite MBSs. 7
The House Committee concluded that permitting banks to underwrite MBSs
was consistent with safety and soundness, and necessary because, as the
traditional avenues of income dry-up for depository institutions, banks
would need to take advantage of available opportunities in related markets
where they have expertise.' 7 6 Otherwise, banks could become supervisory
169. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 560, supra note 28.
170. See infra notes 173, 176, 184, 185 & 189 and accompanying text.
171. S. REP. No. 560, supra note 28. The bill passed in the Senate by a vote of 89-5, but
was not brought to a vote in the House, due primarily to hostility aimed at closing the nonbank
bank loopholes. CONG. Q. ALMANAC 271-76 (1984).
172. S. REP. No. 560, supra note 28, at 1.
173. The Committee explained that the proposed legislation would "permit a DISA to
underwrite or deal in what are commonly referred to as mortgage related obligations." Id. at
17. The proposed legislation defined mortgage related payment bonds as "obligations, with or
without recourse, that provide for the payment of principal on the basis of payments or reason-
able projections of payments on notes secured by real estate and that are rated in one of the
four highest rating categories by a nationally recognized rating organization." Id. at 16-17.
174. See infra note 176.
175. H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 104, at 47 (Comments of Congressmen Wylie, Wor-
tley, Lowery, Leach, Dreier, Hiler, Ridge, Parris and Bartlett).
176. The Committee noted that:
Encouraging the provision of capital to finance the housing needs of this country has
always been a matter of significant Congressional concern and interest. Recent esti-
mates by the Federal National Mortgage Association "FNMA" suggest that $1.6
trillion or more will be needed to finance home mortgages between now and 1990.
Much of this amount (approximately one-half according to FNMA) will be financed
through the origination of mortgages and their resale into the secondary market.
The purchase of a single mortgage by an investor may be unattractive, however,
because of the risk of repayment prior to the stated maturity date. The pooling of
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cases on a nationwide basis.' 77
The fact that mortgage-related securities, including CMOs, are devices
that could help banks cope with the problem of restructuring the earning of
money on loans at rates below which they pay for deposits, a problem cre-
ated by the deregulation of interest rates was also considered by the House
Committee. '78 The Committee members noted that the tremendous volatil-
ity of interest rates in recent years had a profound effect on depository insti-
tutions participating in housing finance.
179
Because of volatile interest rates, it is no longer practical for banks to
make and retain long-term, fixed-rate mortgages.' 8° In response, more and
more banking institutions have sought to make and service mortgages, and
to remove the interest rate risk from the bank by securitizing the loan, there-
fore placing the risk on the secondary market or on investors who are in a
position to earn an elusive interest rate spread.
181
The OCC cited this concern as a factor in the Liberty Norstar decision. 1
82
The Reagan administration is in favor of such underwriting, in part for this
reason. 183 Finally, even the Federal Reserve Board has joined the Commit-
many individual mortgages and the sale of participations in those pools enhances the
attractiveness of such purchases to investors because the pool's diversification
spreads the risk and provides greater actuarial consistency of payment and repay-
ment. Depository institutions, both thrift organizations and banks, and their holding
company affiliates have long been active participants in providing for the country's
housing needs. Depository institutions originate mortgage loans directly either for
their own portfolio or for eventual resale to an institutional investor.
S. REP. No. 560, supra note 28, at 17.
177. See H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 104, at 47 (Comments of Congressmen Wylie,
Wortley, Lowery, Leach, Dreier, Hiler, Ridge, Parris, and Bartlett).
178. Id. For a discussion of the effects of banking deregulation, see generally Loring &
Brundy, supra note 139; Norton, Up Against "The Wall": Glass-Steagall and the Dilemma of a
Deregulated ("Regulated") Banking Environment, 42 Bus. LAW. 327 (1987).
179. H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 104, at 47.
180. Id.; see also G. OSBORNE, supra note 142, at 11.4.
181. H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 104, at 47. In addition, as noted by the Committee,
the fees from servicing the mortgages would, in turn, help to "offset the costs resulting from
(the bank's] having to pay competitive rates on deposits, as they have had to do since the
phase-out of interest rate controls." Id.; see also G. OSBORNE, supra note 142, at 11.4.
182. The sale of mortgage backed instruments will provide a commercial bank an-
other means of adding liquidity on its long term conventional mortgage portfolio.
Instead of holding these mortgages, the bank will in effect sell them, thereby generat-
ing more funds to make more mortgages .... The net effect of the proposal, there-
fore, is to bring additional funds to the home mortgage market.
Letter from Robert L. Clarke, Comptroller of the Currency, to Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato
(June 18, 1986) at 2 (citing Bank of America, supra note 78, at 82,369).
183. See S. REP. No. 560, supra note 28, at 6.
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tee in expressing concern for the liquidity of banks.'8 4 The fact that virtu-
ally the same bill was considered by both the House and Senate underscores
Congress' continued belief that banking institutions should be able to under-
write and deal in CMOs.
8 5
This issue was again addressed in the Secondary Mortgage Market En-
hancement Act of 1984 ("SMMEA"). 186 The SMMEA was drafted in re-
sponse to projections that demands for mortgage credit would exceed the
mortgage liquidity which the federal agencies would be able to provide.18 7
The Senate Committee feared that the scarcity of liquid mortgage funds
would raise the cost of mortgages in addition to making them more cumber-
some to obtain.'18  As introduced, the SMMEA would have explicitly
granted national banks authority to underwrite and deal in MBSs. Both the
House and Senate Committees recognized the benefits that expansion of
bank powers in the MBS market would create.' 89 Nevertheless, the section
was withdrawn in deference to the Reagan administration and the SEC, both
of which preferred that the issuance of MBS be considered with other forms
of securities underwriting as proposed in the Financial Institution Deregula-
tion Act.190
Congress should act to amend section 16 to include both MBSs and
CMOs. This would extend to banks a new, safe method of liquifying long-
184. This view is confirmed by the statement of Chairman Volcker regarding the under-
writing of mortgage backed securities proposed in H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 104:
The mortgage market is being transformed by innovations in communications
technology and in marketing techniques. Banking organizations are major mortgage
lenders and are familiar with the credit analysis and have other expertise necessary to
establish mortgage pools and evaluate the underlying risks of the constituent ele-
ments in the pool. They can already underwrite mortgage bonds guaranteed by the
government or sold by government-related agencies ....
The Board believes that these activities (e.g., underwriting private mortgage-
backed securities) involve a manageable degree of risk for banking organizations and
there is potential for substantial gain for customers in terms of a variety of services
and lower costs.
Id. at 46.
185. See S. 2592, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 99 CONG. REC. S8316 (1986); S. 2752, 99th Cong.,
2d Sess., 99 CONG. REC. S1 1584 (1986); H.R. 5565, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. H7309 (1986); H.R.
5547, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 99 CONG. REC. H7235 (1986).
186. Pub. L. No. 98-440, tit. I, § 105(c), 98 Stat. 1691 (1984) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24
(Seventh)).
187. S. REP. No. 293, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2809, 2810.
188. Id.
189. "The Committee, while taking this action, recognizes the increase in volume and mar-
ket liquidity that would result by having bank participation." Id at 2817.
190. See id.; see also Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications, Consumer
Protection, and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2nd Sess.
43 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2847, 2855.
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term loans. This added liquidity would enable banks to continue making
real estate loans available for those who need them. Not only is the pro-
posed legislation consistent with important public policy interests, but,
under current law, it will not add excessively to those activities that are al-
ready permitted in the banking industry.
Given the current language of the Glass-Steagall Act, banks may already
underwrite CMOs backed by bank-eligible mortgages-GNMA, FNMA,
and FHLMC. 9' A national bank may also underwrite CMOs backed by the
bank's own mortgages under the authority of section 21.192 Banks may buy
and sell private CMOs as agent for their customers.193 Banks may also pri-
vately place CMOs as agent for an issuer.194 Consequently, banks and their
affiliates are more than "generally equipped" to offer CMO services.
Proposed legislation would add to these activities the authority for banks
to deal in the secondary market. 95 Presumably this would provide banks
with authority to repurchase CMOs backed by their own mortgages, as well
as purchase third-party mortgages in the secondary market to back the
bank's CMOs. This authority does not seem excessive in light of the expan-
sive authority already possessed by banks.
196
In addition, banks currently have the authority to participate in the secon-
dary mortgage market pursuant to SMMEA. 19' The SMMEA amended sec-
tion 16 to remove the limitation and restrictions regarding a national bank's
purchase of mortgage-related securities for its own account.' 98 Under the
SMMEA, banks are permitted to invest in privately insured CMOs
originated by other financial institutions.' 99
A comparison of the investment activities permitted by the SMMEA with
the activities involved in underwriting and dealing in third-party CMOs sug-
gests that the latter would be less risky and would better accomplish the
191. 12 U.S.C. § 24.
192. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text.
193. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 468 U.S. 207,
212 (1984).
194. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d
1052, 1056 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
195. See supra notes 171-81 and accompanying text
196. In its comments on the proposed legislation, the Senate Committee noted that, "[t]he
provision of the bill authorizing DISA's to underwrite or purchase and sell mortgage backed
securities merely clarifies that these affiliates of depository institutions can continue to occupy
an integral role in this evolving method of real estate financing." S. REP. No. 560, supra note
28, at 17.





public policy objectives underlying the SMMEA °° and legislation proposed
by both the House and Senate Committees. 201 For example, a bank's invest-
ment in third-party CMOs requires the bank to invest its liquid assets in
someone else's CMO.2°2 This is contrary to congressional goals of increas-
ing liquidity in the mortgage market.2°3 In addition to tying up the bank's
liquid assets, the bank would only be able to earn interest income on its
investment. 2° If allowed to underwrite and deal in CMOs, the bank would
be able to purchase and sell CMOs in response to fluctuations of the mar-
ket.20 5 Additionally, by underwriting and dealing in CMOs, the bank would
be using its liquid assets to create more liquid assets.20 6 When market condi-
tions prevent the bank from selling its investment for a profit, the bank
would still have the option to hold onto its CMO interest until the market
207improves. By generating more funds and providing more liquid capital
for the bank to redirect to its customers, underwriting and dealing in CMOs
by banks does seem less risky and more beneficial than the investment activi-
ties authorized by the SMMEA.2 °8
Thus, by passing proposed legislation, Congress would be providing li-
quidity to banks while providing more money to families to purchase
homes.20 9 Both of these objectives could be accomplished by only a slight
expansion of bank authority.210
In addition, the proliferation of the secondary market in CMOs would
provide its own public benefits. It would enhance competition and help to
equalize the access to credit which ordinarily is geographically distrib-
uted.21 1 Further, the secondary market in CMOs would liquify an otherwise
nonliquid market2 12 while providing investors with an alternative investment
choice. More importantly, it would ensure the availability of credit for con-
sumers and perhaps also lower the cost of that credit.213
200. See S. REP. No. 293, supra note 187, at 2.
201. See S. REP. No. 560, supra note 28, at 17; see also H.R. REP. No. 889, supra note 109,
at 46.
202. See supra text accompanying note 28.
203. S. REP. No. 293, supra note 187, at 2. Instead of providing the bank with a ready
source of cash, purchase of CMOs reduces the bank's liquidity.
204. See supra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
205. See K. LORE, supra note 14, at 1-42.
206. See id.
207. See K. LORE, supra note 21, at 3-20 to 3-21.
208. See supra notes 200-03 and accompanying text.
209. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 185-97 and accompanying text.
211. P. GOLDSTEIN, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 323 (2d ed. 1985).
212. Id. at 319.
213. Studies indicate that an efficient market may lower the cost of credit as much as one
half of one percent. See Lance, Balancing Private and Public Initiatives in the Mortgage-
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V. CONCLUSION
An analysis of the Liberty Norstar decision, in light of the Glass-Steagall
Act, demonstrates that the decision, albeit controversial, is correct to the
extent that it allows national banks to underwrite and deal in bank-eligible
CMOs and to underwrite the bank's own CMOs. A bank's authority to un-
derwrite and deal in bank-eligible CMOs is established explicitly in section
16 of the Act. Authority for banks to underwrite their own CMOs is based
on the section 21 clause, that allows banks to sell obligations evidencing
loans on real estate and on the OCC's legal transparency theory. The same
analysis, however, shows that the Liberty Norstar decision was incorrect in
permitting banks to deal in their own CMOs. Additionally, banks are pro-
hibited from underwriting or dealing in third-party CMOs. Because there is
no exception to the Act's general prohibition against banks underwriting,
dealing in, or purchasing securities for its own account, banks are forbidden
to deal in their own CMOs or to underwrite or deal in third-party CMOs.
A careful study of the CMO market shows that an extension of the bank's
power to participate in the CMO market is both plausible and necessary. It
is plausible because the extra authority would not add significantly to the
power already possessed by banks under the Act. The extension is necessary
to provide liquidity to the bank's mortgage portfolio and to raise fee income
to help fund future loans.
Legislation is needed to authorize banks to expand in the CMO market.
Banks have reached the outer limits of permissible CMO activities under the
Glass-Steagall Act. If banks are allowed to expand into the CMO market,
legislation is also needed to guarantee that the safeguards found in the Lib-
erty Norstar proposal will be adopted in all CMO proposals. There is also a
public policy reason why banks should be able to expand their powers in the
lucrative CMO market: liquidation of the banks' long-term assets provides
additional funds for the home-buying market at a lower cost.
Susan M. Golden
Backed Security Market, 18 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 426, 427 (Summer 1983); see also S.
REP. No. 560, supra note 28, at 97 (additional views of Sen. Proxmire: "The ultimate benefici-
ary will be the American homebuyer whose borrowing costs will be reduced."); S. REP. No.
293, supra note 187, at 2. Solomon, supra note 149, at 2160-64.
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